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POLITICS OF THE FAMILY

Can Marriage Be Saved?
Frank Furstenberg

A

GROWING NUMBER Of social scientists
fear that marriage may be on the rocks
and few doubt that matrimony, as we
have known it, has undergone a wrenching
period of change in the past several decades.
Andrew Cherlin, a leading sociologist of the
family, speaks of "the de-institutionalization of
marriage," conceding a point to conservative
commentators who have argued that marriage
and the family have been in a state of free-fall
since the 1960s.
Western Europe has experienced many of
the same trends—declining rates of marriage,
widespread cohabitation, and rising levels of
nonmarital childbearing—but has largely
shrugged them off. By contrast, concern about
the state of marriage in the United States has
touched a raw, political nerve. What ails marriage and what, if anything, can be done to restore this time-honored social arrangement to
its former status as a cultural invention for assigning the rights and responsibilities of reproduction, including sponsorship and inheritance?
On the left side of the political spectrum,
observers believe that the institutional breakdown of marriage has its roots in economic and
social changes brought about by shifts in homebased production, structural changes in the
economy, and the breakdown of the genderbased division of labor—trends unlikely to be
reversed. The other position, championed by
most conservatives, is that people have lost
faith in marriage because of changes in cultural values that could be reversed or restored
through shifts in the law, changes in administrative policies and practices, and public rhetoric to alter beliefs and expectations.
The Bush administration is trying to put
into place a set of policies aimed at reversing
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the symptoms of retreat from marriage: high
rates of premarital sex, nonmarital childbearing, cohabitation, and divorce. Do their policies make sense and do they have a reasonable prospect of success? To answer this question, I want to begin with the trends that Americans, including many social scientists, have
found so alarming and then turn to the question of how much public policy and what kinds
of policies could help to strengthen marriage.
Demographic Changes and
Political Interpretations

When compared to the 1950s, the institution
of marriage seems to be profoundly changed,
but is the middle of the twentieth century an
appropriate point of comparison? It has been
widely known since the baby boom era that the
period after the Second World War was unusual
demographically: the very early onset of adult
transitions; unprecedented rates of marriage;
high fertility; an economy that permitted a single
wage earner to support a family reasonably well;
and the flow of federal funding for education,
housing, and jobs distinguished the 1950s and
early 1960s as a particular historical moment
different from any previous period and certainly
different from the decades after the Vietnam
War era. For a brief time, the nuclear family in
the United States and throughout much of Europe reigned supreme.
If we use the middle of the twentieth century as a comparison point, it might appear that
we have been witnessing a deconstruction of
the two-parent biological family en masse. But
such a view is historically shortsighted and simplistic. The nuclear family, though long the
bourgeois ideal, had never been universally
practiced, at least as it was in the middle of
the last century. Only in the 1950s—and then
for a very brief time—did it become the gold
standard for what constitutes a healthy family.
Indeed, sociologists at that time fiercely de-
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bated whether this family model represented
a decline from the "traditional" extended family. Even those who argued against this proposition could not agree whether this family form
was desirable ("functional" in the language of
the day) or contained fatal flaws that would
be its undoing.
During the 1960s and 1970s, anthropological evidence indicated that family diversity is
universal, and findings from the new field of
historical demography revealed that families in
both the East and the West had always been
changing in response to economic, political,
demographic, and social conditions. In short,
the nuclear family was cross-culturally and historically not "the natural unit," that many
wrongly presume today.
Although it was widely known that the family had undergone considerable changes from
ancient times and during the industrial revolution, that family systems varied across culture, and that social-class differences created
varied forms of the family within the same society, it was not until the 1960s, when historians began to use computers to analyze census
data, that the extent of this variation came into
clearer focus. For the first time, family scholars from several disciplines could see the broad
outlines of a new picture of how family forms
and functions are intimately related to the social, cultural, and perhaps especially the economic contexts in which household and kinship systems are embedded.
From this evidence, students of the family
can assert three points. First, no universal form
of the family constitutes the appropriate or
normative arrangement for reproduction,
nurturance, socialization, and economic support. Both across and within societies, family
forms, patterns, and practices vary enormously.
Second, change is endemic to all family systems, and at least in the West, where we have
the best evidence to date, family systems have
always been in flux. Typically, these changes
create tensions and often ignite public concern.
Since colonial times, the family has been
changing and provoking public reaction from
moralists, scientists, and, of course, public authorities. Finally, family systems do not evolve
in a linear fashion but become more or less
complex and more elemental in different eras

or among different strata of society depending
on the economic and social conditions to which
families must adapt.
Does this mean that we are seeing a continuation of what has always been or something
different than has ever occurred in human history—the withering of kinship as an organizing feature of human society? The decline of
marriage suggests to some that this round of
change is unique in human history or that its
consequences for children will be uniquely
unsettling to society.
Many scholars weighed in on these questions. It is fair to say that there are two main
camps: (1) those who have decided that the family is imperiled as a result of changes in the
marriage system, a position held by such respectable social scientists as Linda Waite,
Norvel Glenn, and Judith Wallerstein; and (2)
those who remain skeptical and critical of those
sounding the alarm, a position held by the majority of social scientists. Many in this second
camp take seriously the concerns of the "alarmists" that children's welfare may be at risk if the
current family regime continues. Still, they
doubt that the family can be coaxed back into
its 1950s form and favor adaptations in government policy to assist new forms of the family—
an approach followed by most European nations.

S

of those skeptics are not so
alarmed by changes in the family, believing that children's circumstances have not
been seriously compromised by family change.
They contend that children's well-being has less
to do with the family form in which they reside
than the resources possessed to form viable family arrangements. Lacking these resources (material and cultural), it matters little whether the
children are born into a marriage, cohabitation,
or a single-parent household, because they are
likely not to fare as well as those whose parents
possess the capacity to realize their goals.
I place myself in this latter group. Of
course, children will fare better when they have
two well-functioning, collaborative parents
than one on average, but one well-functioning
parent with resources is better than two married parents who lack the resources or skills to
manage parenthood. Moreover, parents with
limited cultural and material resources are unOME PORTION

DISSENT / Summer 2005 n 77

POLITICS OF THE FAMILY
likely to remain together in a stable marriage.
Because the possession of such psychological,
human, and material capital is highly related
to marital stability, it is easy to confuse the effects of stable marriage with the effects of competent parenting. Finally, I believe that the best
way to foster marriage stability is to support
children with an array of services that assist
parents and children, regardless of the family
form in which they reside.
Marriage and Good Outcomes for Children
A huge number of studies have shown that children fare better in two-biological-parent families than they do in single-biological-parent families, leading most family researchers to conclude
that the nuclear family is a more effective unit
for reproduction and socialization. Yet this literature reveals some troubling features that have
not been adequately examined by social scientists. The most obvious of these is that such findings rule out social selection.
If parents with limited resources and low
skills are less likely to enter marriage with a
biological parent and remain wed when they
do (which we know to be true), then it follows
that children will do worse in such single-parent households than in stable marriages. We
have known about this problem for decades,
but researchers have not been equipped adequately to rule out selection. The standard
method for doing so is by statistically controlling for prior differences, but this method is
inadequate for ruling out differences because
it leaves so many sources of selection unmeasured, such as sexual compatibility, substance
abuse, and so on. Newer statistical methods
have been employed to correct for unmeasured
differences, but strong evidence exists that
none of these techniques is up to the challenge. Nevertheless, it is theoretically possible
to examine social experiments such as those
being mounted in the marriage-promotion
campaign and assess their long-term effects on
children.
Another useful approach is to examine
macro-level differences at the state or national
level that would be less correlated with social
selection and hence more revealing of the impact of marriage arrangements on children's
well-being. To date, there is little evidence sup-
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porting a correlation between family form and
children's welfare at the national level. Consider first the historical data showing that children who grew up in the 1950s (baby boomers)
were not notably free of problem behavior. After all, they were the cohort who raised such
hell in the 1960s and 1970s. From 1955 to
1975, indicators of social problems among children (test scores, suicide, homicide, controlledsubstance use, crime) that can be tracked by
vital statistics all rose. These indicators accompanied, and in some cases preceded rather than
followed, change in the rates of divorce, the
decline of marriage, and the rise of nonmarital
childbearing during this period. Conversely,
there is no evidence that the cohort of children who came of age in the 1990s and early
part of this century is doing worse than previous cohorts because these children are more
likely to have grown up in single-parent families. Of course, compensatory public policies
or other demographic changes such as small
family size, higher parental education, or lower
rates of poverty may have offset the deleterious effects of family form, but such an explanation concedes that family form is not as potent a source of children's well-being as many
observers seem to believe.
We might also gain some purchase on this
issue by comparing the success of children
under different family regimes. Do the countries with high rates of cohabitation, low marriage, high divorce, and high nonmarital fertility have the worst outcomes for children? We
don't know the answer to this question, but we
do know that various indicators of child wellbeing—health, mental health, educational attainment—do show higher scores in Northern
than in Southern Europe. They appear to be
linked to the level of investment in children,
not the family form (which is certainly more
intact in Southern Europe). Still, this question
deserves more attention than it has received.
Significantly, many of the countries that
continue to adhere to the nuclear model have
some of the world's lowest rates of fertility—a
problem that seems worse in countries with
very low rates of nonmarital childbearing. I am
not claiming that nonmarital childbearing is
necessarily desirable as a social arrangement
for propping up fertility, but it is a plausible
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hypothesis that nonmarital childbearing helps
to keep the birth rate up in countries that
would otherwise be experiencing a dangerously
low level of reproduction.
Finally, it is important to recognize that
family change in the United States (and in
most Western countries, it appears) has not occurred evenly among all educational groups. In
this country, marriage, divorce, and nonmarital
childbearing have jumped since the 1960s
among the bottom two-thirds of the educational distribution but have not changed much
at all among the top third, consisting, today, of
college graduates and postgraduates. Though
marriage comes later to this group, they are
barely more likely to have children out of wedlock, have high levels of marriage, and, if anything, lower levels of divorce than were experienced several decades ago. In other words,
almost all the change has occurred among the
segment of the population that has either not
gained economically or has lost ground over the
past several decades. Among the most socially
disadvantaged and most marginalized segments
of American society, marriage has become imperiled and family conditions have generally
deteriorated, resulting in extremely high rates
of union instability. The growing inequality in
the United States may provide some clues for
why the family, and marriage in particular, is
not faring well and what to do about it.
Marriage and Public Policy
The logic of the Bush administration's approach to welfare is that by promoting and
strengthening marriage, children's well-being,
particularly in lower-income families will be
enhanced. At first blush, this approach seems
to make good sense. Economies of scale are
produced when two adults live together. Two
parents create healthy redundancies and perhaps help build social capital both within the
household and by creating more connections
to the community. The prevalence of marriage
and marital stability is substantially higher
among well-educated and more stably employed individuals than among those with less
than a college education and lower incomes.
Wouldn't it be reasonable to help the less educated enjoy the benefits of the nuclear family?
There are several reasons to be skeptical

of this policy direction. First, we have the experience of the 1950s, when marriages did occur in abundance among low-income families.
Divorce rates were extremely high during this
era, and many of these families dissolved their
unions when they had an opportunity to divorce because of chronic problems of conflict,
disenchantment, and scarcity. In my own study
of marriages of teen parents in the 1960s, I
discovered that four out of every five women
who married the father of their children got
divorced before the child reached age eighteen;
the rate of marital instability among those who
married a stepfather was even higher. Certainly,
encouraging marriage among young couples
facing a choice of nonmarital childbearing or
wedlock is not an easy choice when we know
the outcome of the union is so precarious. If
divorce is a likely outcome, it is not clear
whether children are better off if their parents
marry and divorce than remain unmarried,
knowing as we do that family conflict and flux
have adverse effects on children's welfare.
What about offering help to such couples
before or after they enter marriage? This is a
good idea, but don't expect any miracles from
the current policies. Strong opposition exists
to funding sustained and intensive premarital
and postmarital counseling among many proponents of marriage-promotion programs. Conservative constituencies largely believe that
education, especially under the aegis of religious or quasi-religious sponsorship is the best
prescription for shoring up marriage. Yet, the
evidence overwhelmingly shows that shortterm programs that are largely didactic will not
be effective in preserving marriages. Instead,
many couples need repeated bouts of help both
before and during marriage when they run into
difficult straits. Most of these couples have
little or no access to professional counseling.
The federal government has funded several
large-scale experiments combining into a single
program marital education or counseling and
social services including job training or placement. These experiments, being conducted by
the Manpower Research Demonstration Corporation, will use random assignment and have
the best hope of producing some demonstrable
outcomes. Yet, it is not clear at this point that
even comprehensive programs with sustained
DISSENT / Summer 2005 a
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services will be effective in increasing partner
collaboration and reducing union instability.
There is another approach that I believe has
a better prospect of improving both children's
chances and probably at least an equal chance
of increasing the viability of marriages or marriage-like arrangements. By directing more resources to low-income children regardless of the
family form they live in, through such mechanisms as access to quality child care, health care,
schooling, and income in the form of tax credits, it may be possible to increase the level of
human, social, and psychological capital that
children receive. And, by increasing services,
work support, and especially tuition aid for adolescents and young adults to attend higher education, Americans may be able to protect children from the limitations imposed by low parental resources. Lending this type of assistance
means that young adults are more likely to move
into higher paying jobs and acquire through education the kinds of communication and problem-solving skills that are so useful to making
marriage-like relationships last.
When we invest in children, we are not only
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likely to reap the direct benefits of increasing
human capital but also the indirect benefits
that will help preserve union stability in the
next generation. This approach is more likely
to increase the odds of success for children
when they grow up. If I am correct, it probably follows that direct investment in children
and youth has a better prospect of strengthening marriage and marriage-like relationships in
the next generation by improving the skills and
providing the resources to make parental relationships more rewarding and enduring.
So it comes down to a choice in strategy:
invest in strengthening marriage and hope that
children will benefit or invest in children and
hope that marriages will benefit. I place my
bet on the second approach. •
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